(Original photo by U.S. Department of State, graphic by Lee Ferran / Code and Dagger)
In the aftermath of the deadly 2012 attack on a U.S. consulate and CIA facility in Benghazi, Libya, the State Department established a special program to beef up security at select locations abroad in hopes of preventing another disaster. In the spirit of tortured acronyms, the effort was named the “Special Program for Embassy Augmentation and Response,” which comes out to SPEAR.
The SPEAR program aimed to provide equipment and training to local security groups, as well as a full-time U.S. expert “mentor” who would work with each local SPEAR unit “to strengthen its operational capacity and readiness.” Currently, there are SPEAR units in 12 countries — all in Africa, save for one in Erbil, Iraq — which cost American taxpayers about $33 million annually.
Earlier this week the State Departments Inspector General released a report on the status of the SPEAR program and found that all-in-all, things are going pretty well so far.
State Department Diplomatic Security officials said “they viewed posts with SPEAR units as having an enhanced level of security and that the presence of a SPEAR unit increased DS [Diplomatic Security] confidence in a post’s ability to handle a crisis,” the inspector general report [PDF] said. “Furthermore, at 12 of the 13 posts with SPEAR units, staff told OIG they thought the units demonstrated greater response capability than would be possible if the posts had to rely solely on regular host nation security forces.”
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The report said that since the program began in 2014, SPEAR units had “augmented security” for more than 500 diplomatic events, and, in the case of Mali, “provided frequent coverage for the Ambassador’s trips outside of the capital…” That last bit is relevant because among the Benghazi attacks’ four victims was U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens, who was far away from the Libyan capital of Tripoli.
Earlier this month the State Department highlighted the work of a local SPEAR team in Lagos, Nigeria, which it said “provided the U.S. Consulate’s Regional Security Office (RSO) with an effective, flexible force whose unique capabilities were instrumental in keeping consulate personnel safe and mitigated the need for external resources.” Both the OIG report and the State Department’s article on Lagos argued that the use of local security forces has been key "as the “familiarity with local conditions, customs, and laws makes them highly effective at de-escalating potential security situations between consulate personnel, the local population and other security services,” as the State Department wrote.
SPEAR units also responded to major security events, like terrorist attacks. During the 2019 attack on a popular shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, SPEAR units were among local security (and a British SAS soldier) who responded, killing two terrorists, while two SPEAR operators were injured. “A third SPEAR unit member used his DS-provided tactical medical training and equipment to render first aid to his wounded team members until they could be evacuated from the attack site, helping to save their lives.”
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The report wasn’t completely glowing, however, as it chided SPEAR units for failing to follow proper inventory processes and the State Department apparently failed to keep proper track of dozens of vehicles it loaned to SPEAR units. It also said U.S. government contractors, who were often the “mentors” to the SPEAR units, sometimes acted too much like U.S. government officials, which can be against U.S. code.
One SPEAR unit was also “under-performing” despite the investment of $3.6 million. That one, in Nouakchott, Mauritania, was bad enough that State Department officials discussed terminating the program there, but apparently there wasn’t a process in place to do that. The report says there now is, and steps have been taken to get rid of the SPEAR program there.
PRIMARY SOURCE: Inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s SPEAR Program (State OIG, PDF)
PRIMARY SOURCE: Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya (Senate Intelligence Committee, PDF)
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